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# Rusk to Oppose Another 'Bundy'

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## If Shakeup Comes, He Won't Repeat Old Mistake

By PETER LISAGOR

SPECIAL TO THE PRESS  
FROM CHICAGO DAILY NEWS

WASHINGTON — Secretary of State Dean Rusk probably made a mistake back in 1960 which he isn't likely to repeat if the White House staff undergoes its anticipated shakeup.

The shakeup is expected to be prompted by the resignation of McGeorge Bundy as special assistant to the president for national security affairs. Bundy has been offered the presidency of the philanthropic Ford Foundation.

If Bundy departs, Rusk almost certainly will recommend against replacing him with a man of comparable stature and prestige.


This is not because of any friction between the two men or because Rusk has thought the Bundy operation ineffective. Quite the contrary: the secretary has worked closely and well with the former Harvard dean and Boston Brahmin.

But by strength of personality and intelligence, Bundy has acquired a co-equal status with the secretaries of state and defense. In his co-ordinating role at the White House, he has inevitably intruded upon the close and essential relationship between the President and his chief foreign policy adviser, the secretary of state.

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THE STATE of affairs was truer during the Kennedy years than since Mr. Johnson became President.

For Mr. Johnson has preferred to lean upon the traditional machinery of government and thus works



DEAN RUSK  
No More Strongman

more directly with Rusk and Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara.

In 1960, when President Kennedy was putting together an administration, he wanted Bundy somewhere in the top echelons of the State Department. According to author Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., who has been critical of the depart-

ment and Rusk in his memoir of the Kennedy period, Bundy's appointment, as well as that of Walt Whitman Rostow, was opposed by Rusk.

"From the institutional interests of the department, this was a grievous error," Schlesinger wrote.

Kennedy promptly decided to take them into the White House, Bundy as special assistant for national security affairs and Rostow as his deputy," Schlesinger continued.

"The result was to give the White House an infusion of energy on foreign affairs with which the State Department would never in the next three years (even after Rostow finally got the policy planning job) quite catch up."

ANOTHER RESULT was to interpose between the President and secretary of state a man who didn't exactly make policy but who had an obvious and often significant influence upon the papers flowing to the President from Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency as well as State.

Bundy's behavior in the post was as circumspect as the President's demands upon him permitted. But there he was, enjoying a kind of co-equal status in bureaucratic and public es-

teem with the heads of State and Defense, sitting in the White House with its attendant prestige.

THE LATE John Foster Dulles, who headed the State Department in the Eisenhower Administration, allowed none of those who directed the national security machinery under an entirely different setup to intrude between him and the President.

Dulles thought it would be an intrusion. It was not only a bad and untidy policy-making technique, but also a dilution of the secretary's responsibility to advise the President and implement his foreign policies.

Dulles would countenance no one between him and Ike, not even an ambitious assistant on psychological warfare named Nelson A. Rockefeller.

Rusk and Undersecretary of State George Ball are understood now to share, to some extent, the Dulles' view. Hence, the Bundy post probably will revert to one of co-ordinating the flow of papers, of a recommendatory and action nature, and any number of bright government officials can fill the vacancy, according to administration sources.